“Every crease is a story.”
the value of information in real estate transactions
"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter…
Rate this book
No ratings here yet. Read it? Leave your mark in the margin.
Gathering editions from Open Library…
Something tucked inside your copy?
A pressed flower, a ticket stub, an inscription on the flyleaf. Photograph it for Found in Books.
Send your copy travelling
Print a numbered bookplate, pass the book on, and follow where it goes next.
A few practical answers before choosing a copy.
Bibliographic source: Open LibraryMarket Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed is by Steven D. Levitt. The catalogue records its first publication in 2002. A later edition may have a different publication date on its copyright page.
"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics. Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions"—National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
The catalogue records 27 pages for a representative edition. Pagination varies with the publisher, format, type size and translation, so check the edition you intend to read.
Compare the publisher, publication date, language, format and ISBN in the editions section. If you need a particular translation or a matching book-club copy, confirm those details with the seller. A work-level page brings different editions together; its first-publication year does not identify your individual copy.
Check a copy's editionRatings labelled Creasy Spines come from readers on this site. A book without ratings here has not been judged negatively; it simply needs readers to contribute. Ratings from another service, when available, are identified separately.
Compare the current seller links on this page, including postage, condition and edition. Availability and asking prices can change. If the copy you need is missing, save a wanted search in Hunt List.
Look for a copyMarket distortions when agents are better informed: the value of information in real estate transactions
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005 / Ebook
Market distortions when agents are better informed: the value of information in real estate transactions
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005 / 21 pp.
Market distortions when agents are better informed: a theoretical and empirical exploration of the value of information in real estate transactions
American Bar Foundation, 2002 / 33 pp.
Showing 3 of 3
Your shelves, ratings and reviews belong to the book, not a particular edition. Edition data from Open Library.